Why do value creation plans stall after an acquisition?
Because the plan competes with the day-to-day business for the attention of the same small group of leaders—and business as usual tends to win. In a McKinsey survey of more than 1,000 executives, fewer than one in three transformations improved performance and sustained the gains. Even successful transformations captured only around two-thirds of their potential value; the largest share of value lost, approximately 35%, occurred during implementation (McKinsey, 2021).
The slippage is rarely dramatic. By month four, the executive responsible for pricing is also closing the month, hiring two team leaders and resolving an escalation from a key client. The initiative has not been cancelled; it has simply slipped. Board reporting still shows a healthy business, so the delay can remain unnoticed for some time.
A lost year matters more today. Bain estimates that a deal requiring around 5% annual EBITDA growth to generate a 2.5x return a decade ago would now require 10–12% growth (Bain, 2026).
Is the plan itself usually the problem?
Rarely. Value creation plans tend to cover familiar ground: acquisitions, expansion, pricing, procurement, digitalisation or AI, and stronger finance capabilities. At a London conference, an operating partner joked that the headings could be exchanged between investment memoranda without anyone noticing. That is not necessarily a weakness. Much of the value is lost later, in execution.
Why can management not simply do both?
Running a business and transforming it reward different behaviours. Day-to-day management prioritises reliability: closing the month, maintaining service and looking after customers. Transformation requires stopping some activities, working across functions and accepting temporary disruption before improvements appear. The same executive may be capable of both, but rarely has enough time for both in the same week.
The management team in place at acquisition is often very good at the business it was hired to run. At a London panel on longer-held investments, one fund partner observed that incumbent teams often have limited experience of delivering a strategic transformation alongside their operational duties. This is not a criticism. It is a capacity issue: unless time for change is deliberately created, business as usual will reclaim it.
Cross functional work is particularly difficult. In a large study, only 9% of managers reported that they could always rely on colleagues in other functions (Sull, Homkes and Sull, 2015). Transformation nearly always crosses organisational boundaries; ordinary operations often do not.
Are too many priorities really a communication problem?
More often, they are a problem of execution capacity and choices. Research by Donald Sull and colleagues at MIT Sloan and London Business School found that only 55% of middle managers could name even one of their company’s five main priorities. Managers were four times more likely to blame the sheer number of priorities than unclear communication (Sull, Homkes and Sull, 2015). Long initiative lists persist when no one has the authority or time to say no.
In an AI programme we led for a PE-owned financial services group, more than 40 ideas were narrowed to six pilots, two of which reached production. The same discipline is needed in value creation plans.
What does effective execution capacity involve?
It is not simply hiring a project manager. Four elements must work together:
- Programme leadership. Someone must be accountable for delivering the agreed plan—not rewriting its content, which remains management’s responsibility. Kaplan and Norton made the same distinction in advocating a small office responsible for the strategy execution process, not for setting strategy (Kaplan and Norton, 2005).
- A regular decision-making rhythm. Weekly reviews with initiative owners, monthly executive reviews and a clear connection to the board calendar.
- Owners with genuine capacity. Each initiative needs a named accountable leader, and that leader must be relieved of some other responsibilities. McKinsey similarly argues that the strongest people should focus on the relatively small number of initiatives responsible for most of the value (McKinsey, 2021).
- Financial tracking. Each initiative must be linked to a measurable P&L impact, distinguishing the performance of the underlying business from the incremental contribution of the plan.
Why is a conventional PMO not enough?
A PMO without decision-making authority becomes a reporting function. It records initiatives slipping for reasons it cannot resolve: owners have no time, decisions remain outstanding and priorities are never reduced. As Kaplan and Norton argued, the unit responsible for execution needs an executive mandate and influence over resource allocation. Otherwise it becomes an administrative layer (Kaplan and Norton, 2005).
How much execution support does one portfolio company need?
Usually less than a full transformation office, but more than a busy management team initially expects. Four questions help determine the right level:
- How many initiatives genuinely cut across functions? Even two or three may warrant dedicated leadership.
- Has this team delivered a transformation while running the business? If not, plan for additional support.
- How full is the CEO’s calendar? If every decision is bottlenecked at the top, the programme lead needs direct access to the CEO.
- How close is the anticipated exit? The shorter the remaining holding period, the less room there is for learning through trial and error.
When does external support help, and how should it end?
External execution support is particularly useful in three situations:
- Initiatives span several functions, but no internal leader has the mandate to coordinate delivery.
- The management team has not previously delivered a transformation alongside day-to-day operations.
- The holding period has lengthened and the agreed plan needs renewed momentum rather than another routine status update.
External support should be designed to hand over responsibility from day one. McKinsey found that about one-fifth of the potential value of a transformation can be lost after implementation, particularly when new disciplines are not embedded into normal operations (McKinsey, 2021). The handover should therefore be specified at the outset: which executives will own the initiatives, what monthly review process will remain and which measures will demonstrate sustained results.
Where should you start?
The following guides address common situations:
- The plan has been slipping for some time: diagnosing why execution is off track.
- You are unsure whether the company needs support: when to strengthen execution capacity.
- You are choosing a delivery model: execution partner, consultancy or interim management.
- The plan includes a new operations centre or centralisation: building operations centres and shared functions.
- The plan includes AI: moving from pilot projects to measurable business results.
- You need a concise management tool: the one-page value creation plan.
What should the board ask?
- Which two or three initiatives will improve EBITDA before exit, and who owns each one?
- What have we deliberately decided not to pursue?
- How much of last quarter’s improvement came from the plan, and how much from the market?
- Which initiative has slipped twice, and why?
- Who on the management team has protected time this month to lead change?
Conclusion
Value creation plans tend to lose momentum in delivery, not in design. Treat execution capacity as part of the investment thesis: programme leadership, decision-making routines, owners with time to act and robust financial tracking. Fit the structure to the company and plan the eventual handover from the outset.
If one of your portfolio companies has a sound plan but a management team without the capacity to deliver it, let’s discuss how to support execution.
References
McKinsey & Company, 2021. McKinsey & Company, 'Losing from day one: Why even successful transformations fall short', McKinsey Global Survey (December 2021, n=1,034). Fewer than one in three transformations improve and sustain performance; successful ones capture about 67% of potential financial benefit, others about 37%; value lost by phase: target setting 22%, planning 23%, implementation 35%, after implementation 20%; embedding transformation disciplines in business-as-usual reduces post-implementation loss. https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/people-and-organizational-performance/our-insights/successful-transformations
Bain & Company, 2026 (midyear). Bain & Company, Private Equity Midyear Report 2026 (June 2026). A deal that needed about 5% annual EBITDA growth for a 2.5x return a decade ago now needs 10-12%. https://www.bain.com/insights/private-equity-midyear-report-2026/
Sull, Homkes and Sull, HBR, 2015. Donald Sull, Rebecca Homkes and Charles Sull, 'Why Strategy Execution Unravels and What to Do About It', Harvard Business Review (March 2015); research with MIT Sloan and London Business School. Only 55% of middle managers could name even one of their company's top five priorities; middle managers were four times more likely to cite too many priorities than unclear communication; only 9% of managers could rely on colleagues in other functions all the time.
Kaplan and Norton, HBR, 2005. Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, 'The Office of Strategy Management', Harvard Business Review (October 2005). The case for a small unit that owns the strategy-execution process, not the strategy itself. https://hbr.org/2005/10/the-office-of-strategy-management
